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J. DAPRAY MUIR*

Perspectives and Developments in
the International Regulation of
Various Commercial Operationst
I.
In light of the attention now being focused on behavioral standards and codes
of conduct for multinational enterprises, I it is easy to lose sight of the fact that

there is nothing new about international regulation of transnational business.
The international community long ago responded to commonly felt needs for
safety with adoption of rules of the road for mariners' and with a number of
more recent conventions. The Chicago Convention required certificates of airworthiness for aircraft in international commerce,I and the Safety of Life at Sea
Convention set minimum requirements for compartmentalization and for maintenance of radio and lifesaving equipment on ocean-going ships.' The Interna6
tional Telecommunications Union s and the International Whaling Commission
derived from a commonly perceived need for orderly use of limited resources.
The International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas in
Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties,' the International Convention of Civil

*Member of the District of Columbia bar. Formerly Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and
Business Affairs, U.S. Department of State.
tBased on remarks by the author at a panel on international regulation of multinational business
at the ABA annual meeting, August 9, 1976, at Atlanta, Georgia.
'E.g., O.E.C.D. Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprise,
O.E.C.D. Press Release A(76)20, June 21, 1976, reprinted in XV Ir'L LEoAL MATERIALS 961
(1976).
'See Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea [1948], T.I.A.S. 2899, 191 U.N.T.S. 3.
'Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation, Arts. 33, 39-41 [1944], T.I.A.S. 1591, 12
U.N.T.S.
295.
4
London Convention on Safety of Life at Sea [19601, T.I.A.S. 5780, 5813, 536 U.N.T.S. 27; see
also 1929 convention, U.S.T.S. 921, 136 L.N.T.S. 81 and 1914 convention, 108 BE. & FOR. ST.
PAPERs 283 ff. (1914, part 2).

'International Telecommunications Convention [1965], T.I.A.S. 6267, 18 U.S.T. 575; see also
Radiotelegraph Conference (1927], U.S.T.S. 767 (first adopting Table of Frequency Allocations).
'International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling [1946], T.I.A.S. 1849, 161 U.N.T.S.
72.
7T.I.A.S. 8068.
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Liabilities for Oil Pollution Damage,' and the Ocean Dumping Convention 9
derived from internationally accepted standards of environmental protection.
The Warsaw Convention'0 has long governed documentation and liability of
carriers in connection with international aviation.
Domestically, we would refer to these types of regulation as "police power"
functions-and the proposed codes of conduct for multinational enterprises are
just another exercise of the same type of power; just one more subject of
jurisdiction for the emerging international bureacracy.
Indeed, even the idea of a code of conduct is anything but new. The draft
charter for an International Trade Organization, signed at Havana in 1948
included provisions for host countriesto take any appropriate safeguards necessary to insure that foreign investment is not
used as a basis for interference in its internal affairs or national policy; to determine
whether and to what extent and upon what terms it will allow future foreign investments; to proscribe and to give effect on just terms to requirements as to ownership to
existing and future investments; (and) to proscribe and give effect on just terms to
other reasonable requirements with respect to existing and future investments."
Not only American business but the International Chamber of Commerce
opposed these provisions, because they failed to refer to investment security and
equal treatment for foreign investment. 2 In 1952, the United States Council of
the International Chamber of Commerce proposed a text of foreign investment
standards which included such precepts as scrupulous conformance with the
letter and spirit of local law, respect for local mores, avoidance of speculation in
local currency, development of local employment opportunities, fair labor
standards, and the avoidance of restrictive practices," but this, and a
subsequent attempt in 1959, failed, probably out of fear host governments
might convert the voluntary provisions into local legislation.
Indeed, when the United States proposed study and development of a code by
the OECD in 1972, what was contemplated was a code to insure "national treatment" for multinational enterprises; no one thought United States law was
inadequate or that MNEs were a world problem. However, foreign reaction to
published reports of bribery and corporation interference gave rise to a fear of
what the United Nations might come up with; it was better to attempt a volun-

'Sen. Exec. G, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1970.
'Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and other Matter
[1972], T.I.A.S. 8165.
"'Warsaw Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to International Transportation by Air [1929], U.S.T.S. 876, 137 L.N.T.S. 11.
"Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization [1948] (Dep't of State Commercial
Policy Series 114).
"IT'L CHAMBER OF COM., Gov-mEMwr GuAuTEs TO INVRSTORS, No. 145, p. 12.
"INT'L CHAMBER OF COM., 1959-61 STATEMEMTrs & RESOLUTIONS 19-21 (18th Cong., No. 217).
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tary code with balance. Accordingly, the United States has generally supported
the code.
It is too early to identify what practical impact it will have on Department of
State action. But it will certainly enter into any dialogue between State and host
governments; and if an aggrieved American company has clearly been in
violation of the code, it will almost certainly affect the vigor with which
negotiations with the host government are pursued-poor corporate conduct
already affects the support which a company abroad can expect from State
Department officials. By the same token, it can be argued that if American
business is to comply with new, more rigorous standards, the United States
government owes its companies wholehearted support when they are confronted
with confiscatory or discriminatory conduct.
But the OECD Code of Conduct is only one of many important developments
confronting the United States with respect to internationalregulation of multinational business.

n.
In the field of international transportation, rates are frequently determined
by air conferences and shipping conferences. Fixed rates are exempt from
United States antitrust laws if they are filed with and approved by the appropriate agency, in the case of air rates, by the Civil Aeronautics Board, 14 and in
the case of shipping, by the Federal Maritime Commission."5 The rates
submitted for trans-Atlantic carriage in 1972 were disapproved as uneconomic,
and trans-Atlantic rates remain open.
Ocean conferences have existed for almost 100 years, and there are currently
some 360 of them around the world. About 125 affect shipping to and from the
United States. As in other fields of transportation, it is felt regular service and
reliable rates require protection from rate wars.
Unlike aviation, however, where participation has always been to some degree
limited by bilateral air agreements, participation in liner trade has been
historically open to ships of all flags. Less developed countries have come to view
this system as preserving a status quo which does not afford them an adequate
opportunity to participate. They have come to view shipping to and from their
countries as a national resource in which they have a right to participate without
the requirement of competition.
Accordingly, in 1974, under the auspices of UNCTAD, a Code of Conduct for
Liner Conferences was adopted in Geneva which would establish the right of

"See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, § 414, 49 U.S.C. § 1384 (1970).
"Shipping Act of 1916, § 14, 45 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
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trading partners to divide 80 percent of their foreign ocean-borne commerce,
leaving only 20 percent for third flag carriage. 6
Primarily because of these cargo allocation provisions, the United States has
opposed the convention. Its policy is not altogether consistent, however, and the
policy may be subject to change. For instance, United States cabotage laws
reserve coastal trade exclusively for American ships,"' and military cargo and
government-owned and foreign aid cargo must similarly use American ships if
possible. 8I While these laws may spring from congressional policy rather than
executive policy, the executive has acceeded to cargo preferences in agreements
with Latin-American countries such as Argentina, 1" and cargo sharing was a
major objective in negotiating the U.S./U.S.S.R. Maritime Agreement2
because Soviet trading institutions, whether importing or exporting, would
otherwise be free to insist on Soviet shipping for reasons of policy and regardless
of comparative costs.
Somewhat surprisingly, the American Institute of Merchant Shipping also
opposes the Code. One must say surprisingly, because usually one hears of the
disadvantages confronted by American shipping in competing for a fair share of
international trade, of its high labor costs, and the need for subsidized shipbuilding. While the participation of United States shipping in liner trade is
substantially greater than its participation in tramp shipping, the 40 percent
participation contemplated by the Code exceeds by a significant amount the
share currently enjoyed by American lines. There are other interests which bear,
of course, such as those of American exporters, whose competitive position in
foreign markets depends on minimum rates fostered by maximum competition.
Accordingly, executive policy was recently reconfirmed by the President's Interagency Committee on Export Expansion in its study of the potential impact of
non-market cargo allocation in United States liner trades. 2
Among other reasons for the government's opposition are the loud
protestations of our NATO allies in Scandinavia and certain divergences from
the United States Shipping Act. Article 12A of the Code provides that rates
"shall be fixed at as low a level as is feasible from the commercial point of view
and shall permit a reasonable profit for ship-owners." These criteria are

"Convention on a Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences, U.N. Doc. TD/CODE/11/Rev. 1

(1974), reprinted in XIII

IN'L LEGAL MATERIALS

912-51 (1974).

"See Merchant Marine Act of 1920, § 27, 46 U.S.C. § 883 (1970).
"See 46 U.S.C. § 1241 (1970); 10 U.S.C. § 2631 (1970).
"See Agreement between Empressa Lineas Maritimas Argentinas S.A. and Moore-McCormack
Lines, Inc., approved May 3, 1973, F.M.C. doc. no. 10038; see also Agreement No. 9932 and
Agreement No. 9939, 16 F.M.C. 293 (1973).
2
Agreement on Certain Maritime Matters, December 29, 1975, United States-U.S.S.R., Annex
I1, pp. 9-11, T.I.A.S. 8195.
"See INT'L ECON. REPORT OF TE PRESIDENT 107 (1976).
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potentially quite different from those of Section 18(b) of the United States
Shipping Act, 22 which authorizes the Federal Maritime Commission to
disapprove "a rate or charge ... so unreasonably high or low as to be
detrimental to the commerce of the United States." More importantly, however,
are the disparities with respect to membership in conferences, which must be
open under United States law.
Under the Code, matters which affect trade between two countries require the
consent of the shipping lines of those two countries. The United States Shipping
Act, however, bars any agreement which does not provide for "equal terms and
conditions for admission and readmission to conference membership," a
requirement which appears to mandate the "one-carrier one-vote" principle.23
Eleven countries have ratified the convention, which will go into effect when
twenty-four countries owning twenty-five percent of world tonnage have ratified.
In that event, the United States could not avoid participation. Some officials
have expressed a desire to compromise at reserving two-thirds of bilateral trade
to national shipping as opposed to the eighty percent contemplated by the Code.
It may be too late for that, however, although the Code is subject to renegotiation in five years. Although over twenty-four nations have signed the convention, since the percentage of world tonnage represented is nowhere near the
required twenty-five percent, ultimate adoption remains open to question. 24
Another current development relating to international transportation has the
full support of the United States government. This relates to the Warsaw
Convention, which was adopted in 1929 and ratified by the United States in
1934. Its rules govern air carriers' liability for injury to passengers and loss or
damage to cargo, as well as ticketing procedures and cargo documentation.2 In
many ways, however, it has become outmoded: its ticketing procedures impede
the use of computers; its liability provisions, which established only a presumption of liability, permitted the carrier to defend with a proof of due care and
limited liability for death or injury to $10,000. The United States has long
pressed for increased liability, and in 1969 even threatened to repudiate the
convention. In Montreal, in 1975, protocols2 6 were adopted which tied the limit
to SDRs now equivalent to $117,000. In addition, the protocols imposed
absolute liability on the carrier; no longer could terrorism or weather be a

2246 U.S.C. § 817(b)(5) (1970).
"147 U.S.C. § 814 (1970).
24
See generally Capone, U.S. Laws and the Convention on a Code of Conduct on Liner Conferences, 15 VA. J. INT'L L. 249 (1975); DEP'T oF TRAIsP., POTENTIAL ECONOMIC IMPACT OF NONMARKET CARGO ALLOCATION IN U.S. FOREIGN TRAIE (1976).
"See note 10, supra.
"Montreal Protocal No. 3, ICAO Doc. 9147(1975); see FitzGerald, The FourMontreal Protocols,
42 J. AI. L. & Comm. 273 (1976).
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defense. Industry acceded in exchange for provisions that the liability limitation
be made applicable to officers and employees of the carrier as well as the carrier
itself. In a recent case, the president of Trans-World Airlines has been included
as defendant in a suit seeking damages in excess of the Warsaw Convention
limits. 27

HI.
In addition to the issues relating to international regulation of international
transportation, the United States is facing a number of important issues with
respect to the production of raw materials. The degree to which nations are
interdependent for supplies of essential raw materials and, reciprocally,
markets, has long been recognized. Rules of fair access were considered as early
as the Versailles Peace Conference," by the League of Nations in 1921,29 and a
World Economic Conference in 1927.30 Also in 1927, a Convention for the
Abolition of Import and Export Prohibitions and Restrictions produced a study
stressing the need for International Principles to regulate access to raw
materials. I'
The paramount interest of consuming countries is, of course, access, and the
most recent expression of this concern is the International Resource Bank
proposed by Henry Kissinger at Nairobi.3 2 The underdeveloped producing
countries, on the other hand, are primarily concerned with stability of markets.
In the past, this concern has found expression in various commodity agreements
relating to cocoa, coffee, sugar, textiles, tin and wheat. 33
34
The International Tin Agreement included buffer stocks, with price limits,
and the Multi-Fiber Agreement of 1973 provides for bilateral marketing
arrangements and restrictions, and entitles an importing country unilaterally to
restrain imports in the face of market disruption. 3 But the United States did
not sign the 1972 International Cocoa Agreement; it gave as reasons technical
problems with establishing quotas on exports rather than sales (which disrupts
commodity markets since the export occurs long after the sale) and the

"Reed v. Wiser, 414 F.Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), appealpending.
2
M. HILL, ECONOMIC & FINACNIAL ORAGNIZATION OF THE LEAGUE
29
C. WILCOX, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 5 (1949).
30
d. at 236.
31
LEAGUE

MATERIALS

OF NATIONS,

REPORT OF COMM.

FOR THE

OF NATIONS

48 (1946).

STUDY OF THE PROBLEM OF RAW

29 (1937).

"154 DEP'T STATE BULL. 657, 661 (1976).
"A. LAW, INV L COMMODITY AGREEMENTS (1975); WHITEMAN, 14 DIGEST OF INTL LAW 617 ff.
(1970).
"See generally Law, supra 57-58; Whiteman, supra 650; see also Fifth Int'l Tin Agreement, Sen.
Exec. J, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1976.
"Agreement regarding International Trade in Textiles [1973], T.I.A.S. 7840, 25 U.S.T. 1001.
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proposed voting system, under which the European Community would have had
an absolute majority of consumer votes.
The United States signed the 1973 extension of the 1968 International Coffee
Agreement, 36 but in the face of worldwide shortages, no quotas were established
and the economic provisions became inoperative. Those provisions would, like
past agreements, establish quotas, regulate exports, provide for certificates of
origin and reexport, regulate processed coffee, regulate imports, establish
production policy and controls, and provide for seasonal financing, diversification and regulation of stock.
In general, the United States has opposed commodity agreements. Like
American industry, government policy makers do not believe such agreements
have worked very well; tin buffer stocks, for example, were quickly exhausted in
the shortage markets of 1974. 1 Furthermore, United States policy makers
oppose market intervention on account of general devotion to the free market
economy.
As a rule, therefore, the United States has responded to demands for
commodity agreements by urging international study groups, such as those for
lead, zinc and rubber. These groups publish statistics on production, consumption, -foreign trade, new projects, and supply and demand; they do not intervene
in the market.3
In light of OPEC's recent successes, however, the producing countries are
demanding something more. At the recent UNCTAD Conference, the Group of
77 demanded a fund to finance price stabilizing stockpiles for a basket of ten
commodities which account for over seventy percent of underdeveloped
countries' exports, including cotton, copra, copper, bauxite, jute, sugar, coffee,
tea and cocoa. The proposal calls for an international board to set parity prices
for commodities, just like the American farm price support system operated in
the 1960s. The board would have a $3 to $6 billion war chest and would
intervene in the market to buy excess supplies. In keeping with its long range
policy, the United States opposed such a fund as requiring too many political
and economic concessions, including both "inflation" and "over-production."
Within the executive branch, the State Department is, as always, more
sympathetic to working with the producers than is the Treasury Department
which insists on minimum interference with free markets. 3 9 One State Depart-

6584, 19 U.S.T. 6333.
"3'hereason, it has been suggested, is that the inventory was too small. See statement of C.F.
Bergsten, Hearings on Natural Resource Stockpiling, Joint Comm. on Defense Production, June 8,
1976.
"aSee WHIrEmAN, 14 DIGEST OF INT'L LAw 628-36 (1970).
3-r.I.A.S.

"See The Washington Post, April 27, 1976, p. A20.
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ment official concerned with these matters pointed out that such a fund might
have less impact than feared, because the buffer stock would necessarily be
limited in size and, with respect to most commodities, market control is just not
practical.
Speaking practically, it is easy to see that buffer stocks would result in more
even prices. But whether they would be generally higher or lower seems
unsettled. American mining companies fear the depressing effect on prices of
buffer stockpiles overhanging the market; the Group of 77, on the other hand,
clearly anticipate higher prices. Experience is similarly hard to interpret: the
United States agricultural price support program certainly created a floor for
agricultural products in this country, but industry still smarts from the tin sales
by the Office of Emergency Preparedness a few years ago. As a practical matter,
any fund would have enormous pressures against selling and would do so
probably only in markets plagued by scarcity, like those of 1973.
IV.
A number of other important instances of international regulation of transnational business may be noted. There is the International Atomic Energy
Agency which regulates safety, disposal of wastes and access to fuels.' 0 The
International Energy Agency 41 has established a system for sharing supplies in
the event of an emergency shortfall amounting to seven percent. Implementation is to be made in close consultation and coordination with industry.
The International Labor Organization 2 also has a long history of developing
minimum standards for hours of work, days off, labor by children, and so on.
Because such matters generally lie within the constitutional jurisdiction of our
states, the United States has ratified very few I.L.O. conventions but it has been
an interested participant in its activities. In 1975, however, it served notice of
withdrawal, primarily because of the increasingly politicized nature of its proceedings and resolutions. Unless rescinded, it will take effect in November 1977.
Although there are a great number of other international regimes affecting
transnational business, those mentioned above are the principal ones with
respect to which there are current issues or developments of concern to the
United States.
It is evident that the less developed countries are searching for means to effect
their demands for a new economic order. There is a new sophistication in their

4

See Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, T.I.A.S. 3873, 276 U.N.T.S. 3; CCH

ATOMIC ENERGY LAW REP. § 8333.
4'See Agreement on an Int'l Energy Program (1974), reprinted in XIV INT'L LEGAL MATmALS 1

(1975).
' 2Constitution of the International Labor Organization [1919], U.S.T.S. 874, 2 Bevans 241;
amended [19461 T.I.A.S. 1868, 15 U.N.T.S. 35.
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proposals and in their negotiations which signals increasing success, and if, as
many fear, continued economic recovery leads to renewed shortages of basic raw
materials, the leverage of the producing countries will be formidable.
For these and other reasons, increased regulation of business by international
bodies can be expected. Diplomats are learning that, for nations of businessmen, business is what international relations are all about. Such regulations do
have effect, and it is increasingly important for management and its lawyers to
keep abreast of international negotiations, to insure appropriate industry input.
Such input is generally a matter of executive branch lobbying, since the
executive branch handles negotiations. If the results of negotiations are
unsatisfactory, of course, a lobbying effort on the Hill may be called for to block
ratification.
It must be remembered that executive lobbying must usually address a
number of agencies-not just Commerce, the C.A.B., or State. Executive
decisions are the result of give and take among many departments and agencies,
and the educational process should address them all.
For its part, the executive branch is generally extremely receptive to information which will assist it in determining the national interest.
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